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Abstract
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing global credit crunch in late
2008, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) announced a large economic package to provide
support to the UK banking sector. As part of the package, the eight largest banks committed
themselves to raising their total Tier 1 capital by £25 billion through either private
fundraising or government assistance. Thus, the economic package featured a new Bank
Recapitalisation Scheme to invest up to £50 billion in capital into UK banking and credit
institutions that could not raise their assets in the private sector. Government capital was
invested into either ordinary or preference shares of the participating institution. As
additional requirements of participating in the scheme, institutions had to commit
themselves to three years of competitive lending toward homeowners and small
businesses, allow HMT to appoint new nonexecutive directors, and withhold all 2008
executive and board member bonuses. In 2009 alone, HMT invested approximately
£37 billion into Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) and the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), where
all invested interest was held by the government subsidiaries of UK Financial Investments,
and later UK Government Investments. While the government remains a majority
shareholder in RBS, it has sold off all invested interests in LBG.
Keywords: recapitalization, capital injection, ordinary shares, preference shares, Tier 1
capital, European Commission, United Kingdom

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. Cases are available from the
Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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At a Glance
Summary of Key Terms

In late 2007, following a leak that
Purpose: “... to shield the economic capital of the
Northern Rock had reached out to the banking system and to ensure that banks were
Bank of England (BOE) for liquidity sufficiently strongly capitalized to meet potential
support, a run on the bank’s deposits stress.”
ensued, leading to an emergency loan by Announcement Date
October 8, 2008
the BOE. Over the subsequent months,
October 13, 2008
Northern Rock and Her Majesty’s Approval Date
(European Commission)
Treasury (HMT) sought to find a private
sector solution, but ultimately ended with Operational Date
October 13, 2008
the nationalization of the company in
Expiration Date
Original: April 13, 2009
February 2008. Throughout the spring,
Extended: June 30, 2013
HMT began examining the health of all
financial institutions and found that a Program Size
£50 billion in two
tranches of £25 billion
larger systemic problem was possible.
Following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy Usage
£37.8 billion loaned to
and the resulting global credit crunch in
three domestic financial
institutions
September, share prices of major UK
banks, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), significantly dropped and their investors and
depositors were withdrawing funds. It became clear to the BOE, HMT, and the Financial
Services Authority that a major recapitalization of the banking sector was required.
Prior to the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme’s operation, the UK government received
commitments from the eight largest banks to increase their total Tier 1 capital by £25
billion. If a bank could not raise capital in the private sector, it was able to request capital
assistance under the scheme. The £50 billion scheme was split into two tranches of £25
billion, the first tranche intended for the largest banks to draw upon and the second
tranche for smaller banks, if needed. HMT injected capital into fundamentally sound
institutions in return for either ordinary or preference shares. Only ordinary shares
granted voting rights to the government, while preference shares paid out a 12% annual
interest rate until 2013 and 7% annually plus three-month Libor thereafter. Additional
obligations of participation in the scheme required the withholding of 2008 executive and
board member bonuses, a three-year commitment to support competitive lending to small
businesses and homeowners, and that the government would determine dividend policies.
On October 13, 2008, the European Commission approved the state aid package for HMT to
recapitalize banks. The Bank Recapitalisation Scheme expired six months later, in April
2009, with no extensions requested by the UK government. Three institutions—Lloyds TSB
and HBOS (which merged to form Lloyds Banking Group [LBG]) and RBS—received capital
from the scheme. The shares received were placed under the management of UK Financial
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Investments (UKFI) for the benefit of HMT and taxpayers. In March 2018, UKFI transferred
all government interests it held into UK Government Investments (UKGI).
Summary Evaluation
The Recapitalisation Scheme was considered crucial in revitalizing Lloyds-HBOS and RBS.
However, there also were criticisms of the design of the scheme. The UK government did
not require all major banks to participate, and this decision may have created a stigma
against any bank that received a government capital injection. The scheme did not account
for further drops in company share prices, leaving the value of the government shares it
received as a fraction of the original price. Moreover, the creation of UKFI to manage the
government’s investments and its respective goals may have been contradictory to some of
the scheme’s goals that authorized the government to have a say over a participating
institution’s remuneration, dividend policies, and membership of the board of directors.
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UK Context 2009–2010
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)

$2.424 trillion in 2009
$2.482 trillion in 2010
$38,713 in 2009
$39,436 in 2010
Data for 2009:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Data for 2010:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
Size of banking system
$4.730 trillion in 2009
$4.635 trillion in 2010
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
195.15% in 2009
186.72% in 2010
Data not available for
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
2009
system
Data not available for
2010
5-bank concentration of banking system
75% in 2009
76% in 2010
15% in 2009
Foreign involvement in banking system
15% in 2010
Data not available for
2009
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for
2010
100% insurance on
deposits up to $4,000;
90% on next $66,000 in
Existence of deposit insurance
2007
100% insurance on
deposits up to $93,000
after October 2008
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Overview

Background
In late 2007, Northern Rock reached out to UK authorities—the Bank of England (BOE),
Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), and the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—otherwise
known as the Tripartite Authorities, for liquidity support (HMT 2007). This information
leaked and led to a massive run on the retail deposit business, where £4.6 billion was
withdrawn, and prompting HMT to extend an emergency loan to the bank. With no luck in
finding a buyer, Northern Rock was nationalized by HMT in February 2008 under the
Banking (Special Provisions) Act of 2008, which granted the government the temporary
ability to nationalize banks (HMT 2012).
In light of Northern Rock’s nationalization, the Tripartite Authorities undertook a full
examination of the UK banking system, finding in the summer of 2008 that “broader
systemic problems” were on the horizon, mostly due to solvency issues in large banks and
building societies. On September 15, 2008, the US investment banking arm of Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, leading to a fast deterioration of the global banking system.
Global credit markets tightened as banks adjusted their balance sheets and contractions in
the UK economy led to a freeze in the overall lending market. According to the BOE’s
October 2008 Financial Stability Report, banks felt significant “funding pressure” following
the failures of Washington Mutual and Lehman Brothers, where banks sought to deleverage
their balance sheets rapidly, resulting in concerns over the capitalization and solvency of
UK banks (BOE 2008). Share prices of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and the Royal Bank
of Scotland (RBS) fell significantly in the following weeks, while other companies sought to
disband or merge certain business units with other banks (HMT 2012).
Seeking to reignite lending and to provide a backstop against further losses in the banking
sector, HMT announced an economic package on October 8, 2008, aimed at combating the
systemic problems across the lending market and mortgage market (HMT 2008a). The
£500 billion bailout package included a series of system-wide programs intent on
recapitalizing banks, guaranteeing bank loans and other debt, and providing extra liquidity
to credit institutions. At the time, the BOE’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) believed
that while the announcement would boost confidence in the UK’s banking sector, the
impacts of the Recapitalisation Scheme’s “scale and timing” were still unclear (MPC 2008).
Program Description
On October 12, the UK notified the European Commission (EC) of the new government
Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, which the EC promptly approved a day later under the
authority of Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty. The overall bank support package required
the largest UK banks and credit institutions to commit themselves to boosting their total
Tier 1 capital by £25 billion, either by raising funds in the private sector or by requesting
assistance from the government under the Recapitalisation Scheme (EC 2008a).
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The scheme’s objective was to “shield the economic capital of the banking system and to
ensure that banks are sufficiently strongly capitalized to meet potential stress.” The
scheme, a cash facility backed by a £50 billion fund, was split into two tranches of £25
billion, with the first tranche intended for injecting capital to the largest UK banks and the
second tranche intended for systemically important smaller banks, if capital necessary (EC
2008a).
To be considered eligible to participate in the scheme, an institution had to have been
deemed solvent and fundamentally sound by the FSA. The type of institution eligible to
participate could have been a domestic bank, a UK-subsidiary of a foreign institution, or a
building society. Capital injections under the scheme were in exchange for either ordinary
or preference shares in the participating institution, with the ultimate goal of ensuring
taxpayers were adequately compensated and that banks were motivated to repurchase
those shares once their capital positions were strengthened. Building societies that
participated issued permanent interest-bearing shares (PIBS) in return (EC 2008a). If the
institution issued ordinary shares in exchange for the capital injection, the UK government
sought the maximum discount rate of 10% on the share price.
All preference shares issued to the UK government paid out an annual dividend of 12% for
the first five years. Thereafter, if the UK government held any preference shares, the
dividend payout was 7% annually, plus the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate
(Libor). As long as preference shares existed, no dividends were paid out to ordinary
shares. In terms of voting power, ordinary shares allowed the UK government to vote at
any annual shareholder’s meeting of the company if dividends were not declared or paid in
full. Preference shares did not provide shareholder voting rights (EC 2008a).
Any participating institution had to abide by special requirements under the
Recapitalisation Scheme (EC 2008a):
(1) Institutions could not pay out 2008 bonus compensation for executives and
directors.
(2) The UK government could dismiss a board member if there was a loss of confidence
by the rest of the board of directors.
(3) The UK government worked with the institution to appoint new independent
nonexecutive directors; the number of directors was based on the extent of the
financial assistance.
(4) Banks had to commit themselves to support lending to small businesses and
homeowners via competitively priced loans for three years.
(5) The UK government could review and determine the dividend policy and bonus or
additional compensation packages of employees.
Last, if an institution continued to benefit from the support under the Recapitalisation
Scheme six months after the initial capital injection, it had to provide a liquidation or
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restructuring plan to the EC. However, an institution could redeem any shares issued to the
UK government five years after the issuance of the shares or on a quarterly dividend
payment date, with at least one-month prior notice to the FSA for redemptions on
preference shares (EC 2008a). The Recapitalisation Scheme was to expire in six months, on
April 13, 2009 but was extended till October 15, 2009 (EC 2009).
Outcomes
Eight major banks—Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC Bank, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide
Building Society, RBS, and Standard Chartered—committed themselves to increasing their
total Tier 1 capital by £25 billion (EC 2008b). Following approval from the EC on October
13, the UK government announced capital injections in RBS, Lloyds TSB, and HBOS; Lloyds
and HBOS were in the process of merging at the time (Darling 2008a). In November 2008,
the UK government created UK Financial Investments (UKFI), a subsidiary of the UK
government, to manage the UK government’s interests in any invested institutions, for the
benefit of HMT and taxpayers, including the interest received under the Recapitalisation
Scheme (HMT 2008c).
RBS received £20.5 billion under the scheme, issuing £15 billion in ordinary shares and
£5.5 billion in preference shares, resulting in a 58% stake in RBS by the UK government.
That stake increased to 68% once the UK government converted the preference shares to
ordinary shares in January 2009 to remove the high dividend rate that RBS had to pay
annually. In November, due to further losses incurred and write-downs by RBS, the
government had to once again step in to inject an additional £25.5 billion, in the form of B
shares, which increased its stake in RBS to about 83%. The government also set aside
£8 billion under a Contingent Capital Commitment if RBS’ Tier 1 capital ratio further
worsened (HMT 2011a).
While the UK government invested in Lloyds and HBOS individually in October 2008, by
January, the government held £13 billion in ordinary shares and £4 billion in preference
shares, equal to a 43.4% stake in Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), once the merger was
complete. The preference shares were converted to ordinary shares in March, with no
change in the government’s stake (HMT 2011a).
In December 2008, the UK altered the requirement that banks had to file a restructuring or
liquidation plan, and instead required that they submit a report that showed “that they
remain fundamentally sound and how they plan to repay state capital (EC 2008b). The UK
government sought multiple six-month extensions of the Recapitalisation Scheme, as well
as the Guarantee Scheme, from the EC, until it the Recapitalisation Scheme was finally
allowed to expire on February 20, 2010.
By the end of 2010, the price of holding stakes in both RBS and LBG became £2.8 billion
annually for UKFI because the share price of each company had not recovered since the
original recapitalizations. It was not until September 2013 that UKFI began to gradually sell
off the government’s stake in LBG. Following two accelerated book builds and two separate
trading plans, UKFI sold off the entire government stake in LBG by May 2017. Although the
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UK government has received net proceeds of £4.6 billion thus far from sales of its stake in
RBS, which started in June 2015, it still remained a majority shareholder (~62.4%) in RBS,
as of June 30, 2018 (HMT 2018). Overall, the share prices in both RBS and LBG never
rebounded from the crisis, resulting in a permanent reduction in the share value for the
government.
On March 29, 2018, UKFI transferred any remaining interests it held to UK Government
Investments (UKGI), a limited wholly owned company of HMT, which for the purposes of
the Recapitalisation Scheme only included what remained of the UK government’s stake in
RBS3 (UKGI 2018).

II.
1.

Key Design Decisions
The UK government announced a £500 billion bailout package, which included a
Bank Recapitalisation Scheme.

According to the governor of the BOE, Mervyn King, the Recapitalisation Scheme in
conjunction with the other two programs under the bank support package—the Guarantee
Scheme and the Special Liquidity Scheme—would greatly resolve many of the UK’s
problems in the crisis at the time. King said, “A major recapitalisation of the UK banking
system of at least £50 billion is a necessary condition for regenerating confidence in the
financial system” (HMT 2008a).
During a House of Commons debate, Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling made it
clear that through the Recapitalisation Scheme, it was not the government’s goal to “run
Britain’s banks—[it] want[s] to rebuild them”. Moreover, he said that to stabilize and
rebuild the banking sector, the government would “maintain [its] stake for as long as it
takes to do that,” with the “aim to sell the public share in the participating banks as soon as
feasibly possible” (Darling 2008a).
2.

There is no legislation on recapitalization or on the government acquiring
shareholder interests in a company.

It does not appear that the UK has any specific legislation in regard to HMT’s ability to
recapitalize banks and receive shareholder interest in companies.
3.

Under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, EC authorized the UK the ability to inject
capital into credit institutions.

Given that the financial crisis led to a contracted credit market, access to liquidity became
difficult for many financial institutions and “eroded the confidence in the creditworthiness

Other investments included UK Asset Resolution, the holding company that held the remainder of Bradford
& Bingley’s mortgage business and Northern Rock Asset Management’s business. The two businesses were
runoffs from the two nationalized banks.
3
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of counterparties”. Because of the role financial institutions played in lending to the real
economy, the EC was particularly concerned that liquidity worries in the banking sector
would spill over into the rest of the British economy as well (EC 2008a). Under Article
87(3)(b) of the Treaty, the EC approved the Recapitalisation Scheme since it concerned the
entire UK banking industry and the EC considered it as aid “necessary to remedy a serious
disturbance in the British economy” (EC 2008a).
The EC also took the scale of the measure, the timeliness of the measure, and the extent of
the measure into consideration. The EC stated that the objective of the scheme and its
scope to only capitalize solvent companies were adequate to revitalize the lending market.
Its position was that capital invested in preference shares that paid high annual dividends
incentivized institutions to redeem shares as soon as possible (EC 2008a).
Finally, the EC noted that while a Special Liquidity Scheme had already been in place in the
UK and the sole implementation of a guarantee scheme had been sufficient to resolve credit
market problems in other countries like Denmark, liquidity shortages and write-downs
might not have been completely covered by a guarantee scheme in other situations, such as
what was occurring in the UK. Thus, the implementation of the Recapitalisation Scheme as
an additional measure was likely to boost confidence in the UK banking system when
working in tandem with the other programs submitted under the banking package (EC
2008a).
4.

All of the UK government’s equity interests in credit institutions were placed
under the management of UKFI. All UKFI interests were later transferred to
UKGI.

In November 2008, the UK government created UK Financial Investments to manage all UK
government interest in individual banks or credit institutions. The overarching objective of
UKFI was “to protect and create value for the taxpayer as shareholder, with due regard to
financial stability and acting in a way that promotes competition”. UKFI’s board comprised
a mix of nonexecutive private sector members, two senior government officials from HMT,
and the shareholder executive, who managed all interests with a long-term perspective and
independently from government supervision (HMT 2008c).
However, in April 2016, UK Government Investments was created as another government
subsidiary that aimed to bring together the investments, which included remaining shares
under the Recapitalisation Scheme, and the functions of UKFI and the shareholder
executive. All remaining interests were transferred to UKGI in May 2018, following UKFI’s
integration into the organization (UKGI 2018).
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Participating institutions were required to boost their total Tier 1 capital by
£25 billion. The UK government held a £50 billion fund under the Bank
Recapitalisation Scheme to provide capital into institutions seeking government
assistance.

Once HMT had announced that three banks would participate in the Recapitalisation
Scheme, £37 billion was raised through sales of gilts and other Treasury bills, according to
the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) (UK DMO 2008).
6.

To be eligible to participate in the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, a bank or
credit institution had to be sufficiently capitalized and have substantial business
in the UK.

A bank had to be “sufficiently capitalized” and a UK-incorporated bank, which included UK
subsidiaries of foreign banking institutions, that had substantial business in the UK, or a
building society. “Substantial business” in the UK meant that the bank was eligible to sign
up for the BOE’s standing facilities according to the framework for the BOE operations in
the sterling money markets, which meant banks with liabilities in excess of £500 million
(EC 2008a). These liabilities included “non-interest bearing deposits and the interest
earned from the deposits [that was] used by the Bank towards funding its operations”
(Winters 2012).
7.

To be eligible to participate in the Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, a bank or
credit institution must have been deemed solvent and fundamentally sound by
the FSA.

In a statement to the UK Parliament’s House of Commons, Chancellor Darling clarified that
an institution had to meet certain requirements prior to being allowed to access capital
under the Recapitalisation Scheme. The institution had to be deemed solvent by the FSA;
“have a substantial business model and delivery plan”; demonstrate “clear, broad-based,
and sustainable” funding and sources; and have a “senior management team [that] must be
credible” to carry out any presented business plan (Darling 2008b).
8.

The UK government injected Tier 1 capital by investing in either ordinary or
preference shares of the participating institutions.

According to the EC decision, if an institution chose to raise funds via ordinary shares, the
institution first had to undertake a placing and open offer, whereby it offered additional
shares to existing shareholders for purchase. The UK government acted as the underwriter
on any of these offers. Any shares that were not purchased by those existing shareholders,
were invested in by the UK government under the Recapitalisation Scheme, where the
government sought the “maximum permitted discount of 10% to the share price” (EC
2008a).
The FSA was responsible for determining how much capital was to be injected into a
participating institution. The FSA calculated the capital assistance by using a variety of
bank-specific stress tests, aimed at substantiating that any amount built outside confidence
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in the bank and that the bank would have enough capital to absorb losses in the case of a
recession, tightened banking conditions, or to continue normal lending practices.
Moreover, the FSA aimed to ensure banks had a ratio of “capital to risk-weighted assets of
total Tier 1 Capital of at least 8% or greater and Core Tier 1 capital … of at least 4% after
the stressed scenario” (FSA 2008).
9.

Ordinary shares granted the UK government shareholder voting rights and was
offered with a maximum 10% discount to the share price prior to placing an
open offer.

This term was also applied when converting preferred shares to ordinary shares (EC
2008a; EC 2009).
10. The preference shares paid an annual interest at the rate of 12% but did not
impose dividends.
The preference shares paid an annual interest at the rate of 12% for the first five years and
three-month Libor plus 700 basis points thereafter (EC 2009; Panetta et al. 2009). Some
considered this interest rate more punitive compared to the US capital injection programs
contributing to stigma for the UK scheme (Farrell and Woll 2014; Culpepper and Reinke
2014).
11. UK government imposed other behavioral conditions, including limits on
executive pay and bank activity, support for lending to homeowners and small
businesses, and assisting mortgage workouts.
Other conditions participating banks must follow were:
(1)

no cash bonuses to directors for the current year’s performance and where it is
contractually owed the bonuses were to be relinquished voluntarily;

(2)

compliance with an Association of British Insurers best practice code on
executive pay, commitment to a new FSA code on risk based remuneration at the
nonexecutive level, and remuneration structures to be reviewed to ensure that
incentives reflect long-term value creation and risk;

(3)

if board members lose the confidence of the board, they could be dismissed at
reasonable and fair cost and UK authorities worked with the board on its
appointment of new independent directors;

(4)

commitments to maintain, over the next three years, lending to homeowners and
to small businesses, at a level at least equivalent to that of 2007;

(5)

commitments to support schemes to help people struggling with mortgage
payments to stay in their homes, and to support the expansion of financial
capability initiatives; and

(6)

the activity of all participating banks limited to the higher of the average
historical growth of the balance sheets in the UK banking sector during the
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period 1987 - 2007, or the annual rate of growth of UK nominal GDP in the
preceding year (EC 2008a).
12. Initially, if the UK government held any shares in a participating institution six
months after the capital injection, the institution was required to submit a
restructuring or liquidation plan to the European Commission. This requirement
was later modified.
Participating banks instead provided a report illustrating that they remain fundamentally
sound and the plan to repay injected capital (EC 2008b).
13. Initially, the Recapitalisation Scheme was to expire on April 13, 2009 but EC
approved an extension through October 15, 2009. Any participating institution
was allowed to redeem shares once the bank was stabilized with a strengthened
capital position.
No further information was found on this.

III. Evaluation
The Recapitalisation Scheme was considered crucial in revitalizing Lloyds-HBOS and RBS.
However, there also were criticisms of the design of the scheme. In a Washington Post
interview with Cornelia Woll, a political science professor at Sciences-Po in Paris, Woll
pointed out that the terms of the UK Recapitalisation Scheme was more punitive than
capital injection program in the US. Therefore, UK government sent a clear signal to the
banks that it is less likely to take risks in the future. However, Woll points out that in the
UK, there was a stigma to participating in the Recapitalisation Scheme, since only the
worst-off banks would require government assistance after failing to recover through
private sector arrangements (Farrell and Woll 2014).
This point about stigma is critical to an analysis of the Recapitalisation Scheme used in the
UK in comparison to the schemes created in other jurisdictions. In their analysis of capital
injection programs in the US and UK, Culpepper and Reinke (2014) note that the UK
allowed for voluntary participation under the scheme, while the US required all major
banks, whether healthy or not, to participate. In the UK, the only banks that would
volunteer were those with weak capital positions and the inability to find private sector
assistance. A second difference they find between the US and UK programs is that the UK
had little to no power to make regulatory or judicial threats to its largest bank since the
largest banks’ proportion of their UK revenue to their total revenue was comparatively
lower than the those in the US. On the other hand, revenue for the largest US banks
depended largely on US business; thus, the government could make credible threats to
those that did not participate under its own capital injection program. They also point out
that this difference may have been a reason why in the US, the CEOs of the largest banks
met with Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson when discussing recapitalizations,
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whereas in the UK, banks would just send their “UK man” rather than the CEO or chairman;
this showed a lack of independence by UK banks to cooperate with government authorities.
Finally, Culpepper and Reinke believe that fees attached to recapitalization in UK were
more of a drawback to participation rather than beneficial to taxpayers (Culpepper and
Reinke 2014).
At the time of their paper’s publishing, the authors estimated that the UK had lost
£12 billion ($14 billion) and a book loss of £32 billion (Culpepper and Reinke 2014). For a
summary of Culpepper and Reinke’s comparison, please see Figure 1.
Figure 1: US vs. the UK in Capital Injection Program Designs

Participation in state
recapitalizations:
Self-selection or not?
Funding of
recapitalizations and
guarantees:
Government subsidy
or cross-subsidy
from banks?

Design Features of the American and British Bailout Plans
United States
United Kingdom
Design
Required participation of major
Voluntary participation of
banks
major banks
Effect
All nine major banks (including
Self-selection of least resilient
healthy banks Wells Fargo,
banks only (RBS, LloydsJPMorgan)
HBOS)
Design
Low, flat, upfront fees paired
Steep upfront fees without
with long-term warrants
warrants; risk-based fees for
guarantees
Effect
Generous help for sick banks;
High nominal charges for
tough terms for healthy and
rescued, mostly state-owned
lucky banks
banks
Gains vs.
$8 billion–$10 billion gain from
£12 billion ($14 billion)
Losses
the Troubled Assets Relief
currently estimated losses;
Program’s bank part (excl. auto
current book loss of £32 billion
bailout and mortgage relief), of
($51 billion) from RBS, Lloydswhich $4 billion came from sales HBOS
of warrants from JPMorgan,
Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs

Source: Culpepper and Reinke 2014.

Dalvinder Singh, a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law, points out that one
condition of recapitalization was that it was to allow the government to make decisions on
retaining or inputting new members on a participating institution’s board of directors and
install new nonexecutive directors. However, the placement of government shares into the
UKFI was counteractive to that condition since UKFI’s powers did not include “intervening
in day-to-day management decisions of the Investee Companies.” Thus, Singh argues that
recapitalized banks legally maintained much more independence than the scheme dictated,
where decisions of directors and executives would lie with the board and shareholders and
could only be affected by UKFI through persuasion, rather than force (Singh 2011).
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